Build fixes

[novacoin.git] / src / crypter.cpp

diff --git a/src/crypter.cpp b/src/crypter.cpp
index 83041ad..ae2b0f4 100644 (file)
--- a/src/crypter.cpp
+++ b/src/crypter.cpp
@@ -6,35 +6,46 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <vector>
 #include <string>
-#include "headers.h"
+
+#include "crypter.h"
+
 #ifdef WIN32
 #include <windows.h>
 #endif
 
-#include "crypter.h"
-#include "main.h"
-#include "util.h"
+//
+//CMasterKey
+//
+
+CMasterKey::CMasterKey()
+{
+    // 25000 rounds is just under 0.1 seconds on a 1.86 GHz Pentium M
+    // ie slightly lower than the lowest hardware we need bother supporting
+    nDeriveIterations = 25000;
+    nDerivationMethod = 0;
+    vchOtherDerivationParameters = std::vector<unsigned char>(0);
+}
+
+//
+//CCrypter
+//
 
 bool CCrypter::SetKeyFromPassphrase(const SecureString& strKeyData, const std::vector<unsigned char>& chSalt, const unsigned int nRounds, const unsigned int nDerivationMethod)
 {
     if (nRounds < 1 || chSalt.size() != WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE)
         return false;
 
-    // Try to keep the keydata out of swap (and be a bit over-careful to keep the IV that we don't even use out of swap)
-    // Note that this does nothing about suspend-to-disk (which will put all our key data on disk)
-    // Note as well that at no point in this program is any attempt made to prevent stealing of keys by reading the memory of the running process.  
-    mlock(&chKey[0], sizeof chKey);
-    mlock(&chIV[0], sizeof chIV);
-
     int i = 0;
     if (nDerivationMethod == 0)
+    {
         i = EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_aes_256_cbc(), EVP_sha512(), &chSalt[0],
-                          (unsigned char *)&strKeyData[0], strKeyData.size(), nRounds, chKey, chIV);
+                          (const unsigned char *)&strKeyData[0], strKeyData.size(), nRounds, chKey, chIV);
+    }
 
-    if (i != WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE)
+    if (i != (int)WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE)
     {
-        memset(&chKey, 0, sizeof chKey);
-        memset(&chIV, 0, sizeof chIV);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(&chKey, sizeof chKey);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(&chIV, sizeof chIV);
         return false;
     }
 
@@ -47,12 +58,6 @@ bool CCrypter::SetKey(const CKeyingMaterial& chNewKey, const std::vector<unsigne
     if (chNewKey.size() != WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE || chNewIV.size() != WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE)
         return false;
 
-    // Try to keep the keydata out of swap
-    // Note that this does nothing about suspend-to-disk (which will put all our key data on disk)
-    // Note as well that at no point in this program is any attempt made to prevent stealing of keys by reading the memory of the running process.  
-    mlock(&chKey[0], sizeof chKey);
-    mlock(&chIV[0], sizeof chIV);
-
     memcpy(&chKey[0], &chNewKey[0], sizeof chKey);
     memcpy(&chIV[0], &chNewIV[0], sizeof chIV);
 
@@ -76,9 +81,9 @@ bool CCrypter::Encrypt(const CKeyingMaterial& vchPlaintext, std::vector<unsigned
     bool fOk = true;
 
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, chKey, chIV);
-    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, &vchCiphertext[0], &nCLen, &vchPlaintext[0], nLen);
-    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, (&vchCiphertext[0])+nCLen, &nFLen);
+    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, chKey, chIV) != 0;
+    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, &vchCiphertext[0], &nCLen, &vchPlaintext[0], nLen) != 0;
+    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, (&vchCiphertext[0]) + nCLen, &nFLen) != 0;
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
     if (!fOk) return false;
@@ -103,9 +108,9 @@ bool CCrypter::Decrypt(const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchCiphertext, CKeyingM
     bool fOk = true;
 
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, chKey, chIV);
-    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, &vchPlaintext[0], &nPLen, &vchCiphertext[0], nLen);
-    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, (&vchPlaintext[0])+nPLen, &nFLen);
+    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, chKey, chIV) != 0;
+    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, &vchPlaintext[0], &nPLen, &vchCiphertext[0], nLen) != 0;
+    if (fOk) fOk = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, (&vchPlaintext[0]) + nPLen, &nFLen) != 0;
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
     if (!fOk) return false;
@@ -114,6 +119,31 @@ bool CCrypter::Decrypt(const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchCiphertext, CKeyingM
     return true;
 }
 
+void CCrypter::CleanKey()
+{
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&chKey, sizeof chKey);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&chIV, sizeof chIV);
+    fKeySet = false;
+}
+
+CCrypter::CCrypter()
+{
+    fKeySet = false;
+
+    // Try to keep the key data out of swap (and be a bit over-careful to keep the IV that we don't even use out of swap)
+    // Note that this does nothing about suspend-to-disk (which will put all our key data on disk)
+    // Note as well that at no point in this program is any attempt made to prevent stealing of keys by reading the memory of the running process.
+    LockedPageManager::instance.LockRange(&chKey[0], sizeof chKey);
+    LockedPageManager::instance.LockRange(&chIV[0], sizeof chIV);
+}
+
+CCrypter::~CCrypter()
+{
+    CleanKey();
+
+    LockedPageManager::instance.UnlockRange(&chKey[0], sizeof chKey);
+    LockedPageManager::instance.UnlockRange(&chIV[0], sizeof chIV);
+}
 
 bool EncryptSecret(CKeyingMaterial& vMasterKey, const CSecret &vchPlaintext, const uint256& nIV, std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCiphertext)
 {