#include <windows.h>
#endif
+//
+//CMasterKey
+//
+
+CMasterKey::CMasterKey()
+{
+ // 25000 rounds is just under 0.1 seconds on a 1.86 GHz Pentium M
+ // ie slightly lower than the lowest hardware we need bother supporting
+ nDeriveIterations = 25000;
+ nDerivationMethod = 0;
+ vchOtherDerivationParameters = std::vector<unsigned char>(0);
+}
+
+//
+//CCrypter
+//
+
bool CCrypter::SetKeyFromPassphrase(const SecureString& strKeyData, const std::vector<unsigned char>& chSalt, const unsigned int nRounds, const unsigned int nDerivationMethod)
{
if (nRounds < 1 || chSalt.size() != WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE)
if (nDerivationMethod == 0)
{
i = EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_aes_256_cbc(), EVP_sha512(), &chSalt[0],
- (unsigned char *)&strKeyData[0], strKeyData.size(), nRounds, chKey, chIV);
+ (const unsigned char *)&strKeyData[0], strKeyData.size(), nRounds, chKey, chIV);
}
if (i != (int)WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE)
return true;
}
+void CCrypter::CleanKey()
+{
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&chKey, sizeof chKey);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&chIV, sizeof chIV);
+ fKeySet = false;
+}
+
+CCrypter::CCrypter()
+{
+ fKeySet = false;
+
+ // Try to keep the key data out of swap (and be a bit over-careful to keep the IV that we don't even use out of swap)
+ // Note that this does nothing about suspend-to-disk (which will put all our key data on disk)
+ // Note as well that at no point in this program is any attempt made to prevent stealing of keys by reading the memory of the running process.
+ LockedPageManager::instance.LockRange(&chKey[0], sizeof chKey);
+ LockedPageManager::instance.LockRange(&chIV[0], sizeof chIV);
+}
+
+CCrypter::~CCrypter()
+{
+ CleanKey();
+
+ LockedPageManager::instance.UnlockRange(&chKey[0], sizeof chKey);
+ LockedPageManager::instance.UnlockRange(&chIV[0], sizeof chIV);
+}
bool EncryptSecret(CKeyingMaterial& vMasterKey, const CSecret &vchPlaintext, const uint256& nIV, std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCiphertext)
{