0xDF,0xE9,0x2F,0x46,0x68,0x1B,0x20,0xA0
};
-const unsigned char vchZero[0] = {};
+const unsigned char *vchZero = NULL;
bool CKey::Verify(uint256 hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig)
{
- // -1 = error, 0 = bad sig, 1 = good
- if (ECDSA_verify(0, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), &vchSig[0], vchSig.size(), pkey) != 1)
+ if (vchSig.empty())
return false;
- return true;
+ // New versions of OpenSSL will reject non-canonical DER signatures. de/re-serialize first.
+ unsigned char *norm_der = NULL;
+ ECDSA_SIG *norm_sig = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+ const unsigned char* sigptr = &vchSig[0];
+ assert(norm_sig);
+ if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&norm_sig, &sigptr, vchSig.size()) == NULL)
+ {
+ /* As of OpenSSL 1.0.0p d2i_ECDSA_SIG frees and nulls the pointer on
+ * error. But OpenSSL's own use of this function redundantly frees the
+ * result. As ECDSA_SIG_free(NULL) is a no-op, and in the absence of a
+ * clear contract for the function behaving the same way is more
+ * conservative.
+ */
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(norm_sig);
+ return false;
+ }
+ int derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(norm_sig, &norm_der);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(norm_sig);
+ if (derlen <= 0)
+ return false;
+
+ // -1 = error, 0 = bad sig, 1 = good
+ bool ret = ECDSA_verify(0, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), norm_der, derlen, pkey) == 1;
+ OPENSSL_free(norm_der);
+ return ret;
}
bool CKey::VerifyCompact(uint256 hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig)